ABSTRACT Recently, multiparty quantum key agreement (MQKA) protocols have gained increasing attention. Several MQKA protocols in the traveling mode have been proposed for higher key generation rates, which, however, are vulnerable to a collusive attack presented by Liu. In this paper, an analysis of Liu's collusive attacks on Cao et al.'s protocol is given, based on which an efficient MQKA protocol that requires only sequential communication of a single d-level quantum system is put forward. Because of the single d-level quantum system, our protocol has huge advantages in scalability and can be realized with the state-of-the-art technology. The scalability means that each additional participant is only required to perform a unitary operator that is comparatively simple, and the complexity of measurements remains independent of the number of participants. Our protocol can also resist Liu's collusive attacks due to the encrypted quantum channel and has an efficiency rate of 1 2N (N is the number of participants) that is much better than those of other quantum key agreement protocols. In addition, by using the proposed encoding method, a wide class of problems for which quantum information protocols based on multisystem entanglement can be mapped into much simpler ones involving only one system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution is the best-known example of a quantum cryptographic task which is a secure communication method implementing a cryptographic protocol involving components of quantum mechanics. An important and unique property of quantum cryptographic protocols is the ability to detect the presence of any third party trying to gain knowledge of the secret key. This results from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle: the process of measuring a quantum system in general disturbs the system. A third party trying to eavesdrop on the key must in some way measure it, thus
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introducing detectable anomalies. By using quantum superpositions and transmitting information in quantum channels, a communication system can be implemented to detect eavesdropping. If the level of eavesdropping is below a certain threshold, a secure key can be produced, i.e., the eavesdropper has no information about it, otherwise the communication is aborted and no secure key is possible. The quantum key distribution protocols usually are used in the scenario where one party generates the key, and simply sends the key to the other party, and the other party has no influence on the agreed key. It may be unavailable, in some cases, to use quantum key distribution in a secure quantum multiparty computation system, since the fairness usually needs to be taken into account in this situation. Recently, a new branch of quantum cryptography, known as quantum key agreement (QKA), has received increasing attention. Using a quantum key agreement protocol avoids some of the key distribution problems associated with such systems. A quantum key agreement protocol is a protocol whereby two or more parties can agree on a key in such a way that each party influences the outcome. If properly done, this precludes an undesired third party from forcing a key choice on the agreeing parties, and the protocol also does not reveal to any eavesdropper what key has been agreed upon. Since it was first proposed by Zhou et al. in 2004 [1] , a variety of QKA protocols have been proposed. In the previously works, only two participants were involved in the QKA protocols [2] - [7] . Recently, an enhanced interest on multiparty QKA protocols has been observed [8] - [17] . However, it was found that most of the quantum key agreement protocols cannot resist collusive attacks [18] , i.e., part of the participants of the group can predetermine the shared key before the end of the protocol. Thus, how to construct a fair and secure key agreement protocol has obtained much attention [19] - [23] . Liu's protocol [18] shows that the collusive attack on quantum multiparty key agreement protocols can succeed in a travelling mode since the dishonest participants share the information of the initial prepared quantum states with each other. When two particular position's parties collude with each other, they can predetermine the bitwise exclusive OR result of all the other's secret keys. Then, they are able to control the final shared key with this information. Thus, the most circle type multiparty QKA protocols are not secure against the collusive attack.
Wang's protocol [21] presents a general way to construct a secure multiparty QKA protocol secure against any t dishonest participants' collusive attack. Here t < N and N is the number of participants in their protocol. However, Wang's protocol is a bit complicated and the qubit efficiency is low. Ref. [19] proposes a quantum key agreement protocol whose embed mode of subkey is based on a quantum search algorithm. Nevertheless, we found that Ref. [19] may be suspectable to Liu's attack [18] . To be secure against Liu's attack, the quantum channel can be encrypted during carrying out the protocol. Thus, even the dishonest participants share the information of the initial prepared quantum states with each other, they cannot predetermine the final shared key anymore. Ref. [22] uses random control strings to bring the above idea into effect. Cai et al. [24] consider a multipartite quantum key agreement protocol over collective noise channels. With quantum dense coding and Bell states, He et al. [25] propose a high-efficiency three-party quantum key agreement protocol. Rebeiro et al. [26] present a fully device-independent conference key agreement protocol.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, a multiparty quantum key agreement protocol against collusive attacks with d-level quantum systems in the travelling mode is presented. Our contributions are fourfold:
• An efficient MQKA protocol is proposed which requires only sequential communication of a single d-level quantum system. It has huge advantages in scalability and can be realized with the state-of-the-art technology.
• The quantum channel is encrypted by a unitary operation during the key agreement protocol. And, it is proven that the protocol does not reveal to any eavesdropper, what key has been agreed upon, and the dishonest participants in collaboration can be prevented from predetermining the final key.
• A wide class of problems for which quantum information protocols based on multisystem entanglement can be mapped into much simpler ones involving only one system by using the proposed method.
• The efficiency of our protocol, 1 2N , is much better than those of other quantum key agreement protocols; see the efficiency comparison in Section V. We hope the results of the presented paper will be helpful for further research on fair and efficient multiparty QKA protocols.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some notations about mutually unbiased (orthonormal) bases (MUBs), the cyclic property of the set of MUBs, and the Cao et al.s' protocol (CM MQKA protocol) [19] , then we show an attack on CM MQKA protocol based on Liu's attack [18] . The fair multiparty QKA protocol will then be presented in Section III, followed by the correctness and security analyses of our protocol in Section IV. Section V makes an efficiency comparison with existing protocols, and we conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE

A. PRELIMINARIES
In the proposed protocol, all parties choose the quantum state from a measurement basis which belongs to a set of d mutually unbiased (orthonormal) bases (MUBs). The states from the computational basis are denoted by |k in our paper, and the d MUBs are given as
where ω = e 2πi/d , j = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1 labels the basis and i = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1 enumerates the vector of the given basis. We will denote by M the set of all vectors belonging to the MUB defined by (1), and its elements by M i,j , with the meaning of the indices as above.
In the proposed protocol, d is restricted to odd primes because our protocol uses a cyclic property of the set of MUBs: There exists a unitary transformation U i j , such that for any i , j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}, any vector M i,j can be mapped into M i+i ,j+j .
Define the unitary operator
For any vector M i,j , we have
Similarly, define 
B. BRIEF REVIEW OF THE CM PROTOCOL
We first briefly review the CM protocol [19] , in which N participants, P 0 , · · · , P N −1 , intend to share a random and
And the party P i , i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, has secret bit strings keys K i with length 2n, respectively. 1) Initialization Phase. Each participant P i selects two random sequences S i and V i with length 2n, and prepares a two-particle quantum states sequence S i,i+1 according to the random sequence S i . 2) Next, P i performs unitary operations U V , according the sequence V i on the quantum states sequence S i,i+1 , and the resulted sequence is denoted as S i→i+1 . P i sends S i→i+1 to P i+1 by using decoy states method. 3) Encoding Phase. After receiving secure S i→i+1 , P i+1 performs unitary operation U K i+1 on the quantum states sequence S i→i+1 according to his private key K i+1 , denotes the resulted sequence as S i→i+2 , and sends S i→i+2 to P i+2 similar to step 2. 4) Encoding Recursively Phase. P i+2 , · · · , P i−1 execute eavesdropping checking and encoding phase similar to P i+1 in step 3. 5) Extracting Common Key Phase. After receiving secure S i→i from P i−1 , P i performs unitary operation U S on S i→i according to the sequence S i , and then takes measurements on every resulted two-particle state with basis {|00 , |01 , |10 , |11 } if N is odd, or {| + + ,
Denote the sequence of measured result as W i . Then, the target common key K can be computed:
C. LIU'S COLLUSIVE ATTACK ON CM PROTOCOL
Liu's collusive attack can be divided into two stages: the key stealing stage and the key flipping stage. In the key stealing stage, the collusive participants try to get the bitwise exclusive OR result of the others' secret keys in some novel way. Then, they try to flip the encoded secret keys according to the above result to control the final key in the key flipping stage.
Ref. [18] shows that any two participants P n and P m (n > m) are enough to totally control the final key, as long as their positions in the circle satisfy the following conditions:
When the above conditions are satisfied, P n and P m can perform the following collusive attack on CM protocol:
The key stealing stage:
• At the beginning of the protocol, P n and P m share all the initial information about S n , V n , K n and S m , V m , K m and the value of the expected key K .
• In the (n − m)-th period started by P m , when P n receives the travel sequence S m→n , combined with the shared information about S m , V m , P n can obtain the bitwise exclusive OR result of the secret keys
by executing the Extracting Common Key Phase, i.e., P n performs unitary operation U S on S m→n according to the sequence S m , and then takes measurements on every resulted twoparticle state with basis {|00 ,
Denote the sequence of measured result as W n . Then, the bitwise exclusive OR result of the secret key
Similarly, P m can get the bitwise exclusive OR result of the secret keys K n+1 , K n+2 , · · · , K m−1 in the (N − n + m)-th period started by P n .
• P n (P m ) sends the above bitwise exclusive OR result to P m (P n ) immediately when he gets it. The key flipping stage:
• In the n − m = N 2 period (Here, we only consider the situation when N is an even number. For the odd N , the situation is similar.), each of P n and P m gets the bitwise exclusive OR result of half of the others' secret keys. After exchanging with each other, they get the legal final key K ahead of others. Then P n and P m can predetermine the final key by encoding
, respectively in the rest periods. Here, K is the fake key. It can be verified that, in the last period, for any participant P i , he will get the final key K .
III. THE PROPOSED MQKA PROTOCOL WITH D-LEVEL QUANTUM SYSTEM
Similar to existing QKA protocols, the classical channels involved in our protocol are assumed to be authenticated. The quantum channels in our protocol are assumed to be noiseless and lossless. Suppose that there are N participants P 0 , · · · , P N −1 , and they have secret keys x 0 , · · · , x N −1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}, respectively. They want to run the protocol VOLUME 7, 2019 a i ∈ M and it will be denoted by |φ i i . Here, |φ i i is used to generate the final shared key and is called a quantum message state. Notice that P i can randomly prepare multiple quantum message states for sharing a larger key. However, for easier and clear description of the proposed protocol, let P i prepare a state |e b i a i for sharing the final key in the following part. The quantum message state will go through the whole procedure. To check the security of the quantum channel from P i to P i+1 , P i also randomly generates q ordered quantum states, each of which is randomly in one of the states 
the detection stage and encoding stage sequentially in the same way just as in step 2 and step 3 do. That is, for n = i + 2, · · · , i − 1, P n−1 and P n use the decoy check states to check the quantum channel, and calculate the error rate. If the error rate is greater than the predetermined threshold value, the protocol will be terminated and restarted from step 1; otherwise, P n randomly chooses a number y i n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d − 1}, and performs the unitary operator X n−1 , inserts the new generated quantum message state |φ i n into the decoy check sates and sends the new generated quantum sequence G i n to P n+1 . 5) When receiving G i i−1 from P i−1 , P i sends an acknowledgment of receipt to P i−1 . When receiving all the N participants' acknowledgments of receipt, P i−1 announces to P i the positions and corresponding bases of the decoy check states. According to the announced information, P i measures the decoy check states in the correct bases and randomly announces half of the measurement outcomes. Correspondingly, P i−1 publishes the initial states of the other half of the decoy check states. By comparing the measurement results of decoy check states with their corresponding initial prepared states, P i−1 and P i calculate the error rate. If the error rate is greater than the predetermined threshold value, the protocol will be terminated and restarted from step 1; otherwise, P i obtains the secure quantum message state sequence |φ 6) The participant P n announces his choice of y i n , here n = 0, · · · , N − 1. Then P i calculates
Based on J , P i measures the quantum message state |φ i in the basis {|e J 0 , |e J 1 , . . . , |e J d−1 }, and the outcome will be |φ ∈ {|e J 0 , |e J 1 , . . . , |e J d−1 }. If we make the following encoding:
then according to (3) and (4), the following equation
holds. The final shared key can be obtained by the calculation
Now, we have presented a new multiparty quantum key agreement protocol.
In the next section, the correctness and the security of the presented protocol will be discussed.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED MULTIPARTY QKA PROTOCOL
In this section, we will give the correctness and security analysis of the proposed multiparty QKA protocol. First, we show that if all parties execute the protocol honestly, they will get the final shared key correctly. Then, the proposed protocol is secure against external eavesdropping. Finally, we show that it is immune to attacks from internal eavesdropping.
A. CORRECTNESS
From the above protocol, the quantum message state prepared by P i is |e 
In accordance with the cyclic property of the set of MUBs introduced in subsection II-A, we have 
Finally, P i can easily get
B. SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNAL EAVESDROPPING
The decoy-state method is used in our protocol to detect outside eavesdropping. In the decoy-state method, besides target states, several non-orthogonal single states, |+ , |− , | + y , | − y , as decoy states are used. Since eavesdropper cannot distinguish between the target states and the decoy states, she usually applies the same strategy to all of them. Without loss of generality, the most general strategy Eve makes is the operation U E which causes the target states to interact coherently with an ancillary quantum system |E , which can be described as follows:
where |a| 2 + |b| 2 = 1 and |c| 2 + |d| 2 = 1. Next, we will prove that any eavesdropping attempt by eavesdropper will inevitably modify the photon statistic and expose her.
Since the decoy states involved in our protocol are |+ , |− , |+y and |−y , if Eve introduces no error in the eavesdropping check by participants, the general operation U E must satisfy the following conditions: 
. (21) From (18), (19), (20), and (21), we can get
Here 0 denotes a column zero vector. Further, we can get a = d = 1, b = c = 0 and |E 00 = |E 11 . Therefore, we have
U E |+ |E = |+ |E 00 ,
i.e., Eve introduces no error in the eavesdropping only when her ancillary state and the target photon {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− } are product states. So outside eavesdroppers cannot obtain the shared key without being detected.
C. SECURITY AGAINST INTERNAL EAVESDROPPING
As known to all, internal participants have more power to launch an attack than those from external eavesdroppers. Dishonest internal participant who could benefit from substituting the message sequence with his desired sequence or lying in the process of eavesdropping detection to avoid introducing errors may choose to initiate an internal attack against a group through his obtained internal resources. Thus, all the proposed QKA protocols need to be immune to eavesdropping attacks from internal participants. Liu's collusive attack can be divided into two stages: the key stealing stage and the key flipping stage. The reason CM MQKA protocol is insecure is that the collusive participants share all the information about the initial prepared quantum states and the quantum channel is not encrypted by any other participants. With the shared information about the initial states, two participants in two particular positions can get the exclusive OR result about the honest participants' keys, which is shown in subsection II-C. In order to resist Liu's collusive attack, the key stealing stage must be destroyed.
We will show that the proposed protocol is robust against the stealing stage, i.e., the collusive participants cannot get the bitwise exclusive OR result of the others' secret keys.
We first consider the worst case that N − 1 dishonest participants collaborate to determine the final shared key, and the only one honest participant is P t , t ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1}. It is not hard to determine the final shared key for the N − 1 dishonest participants if they are able to obtain P t 's private key x t before P t+1 s quantum message state |φ t+1 t+1 is sent to P t . Specially, P t+1 sends the sequence G t+1 t+1 to P t+2 . Then, the N −2 dishonest participants P t+2 , · · · , P t−1 only perform the eavesdropping detection, i.e., they, one by one, insert decoy states into the quantum message state and send the new sequence to the next participant, then they check the eavesdropping. When P t−1 receives G t+1 t−2 from P t−2 , he first checks eavesdropping, then encodes x t ⊕K onto the quantum message state, inserts decoy states into it and sends the new sequence to P t . It is easy to verify that the final key P t obtained is the fake key
However, the N − 1 dishonest participants cannot obtain P t 's private key x t before P t+1 's quantum message state |φ t+1 t+1 is sent to P t in the proposed protocol. The main reason is that P t encodes the quantum message state by two unitary operators X . Notice that j and j + y t label the basis in the quantum message state. Thus, without the information about y t , dishonest participants cannot decrypt the quantum message state. Since they have no idea which basis should be chosen to measure the quantum message state, thus cannot obtain P t 's private key x t and any useful information about x t . So the key stealing stage is prevented, and Liu's collusive attack cannot work anymore in our protocol. If dishonest participants try to obtain x t , the only way is to measure the quantum sequence just like the external eavesdroppers does. However, the security against external eavesdropping is proven in the above subsection.
In the second case, some malicious participants may not want to completely control the final key K . What they want is to fool some legitimate parties. Because participants are not forced to commit to the information they broadcast, malicious participant P s can encode x s ⊕ x f in the encoding stage in order to fool legitimate participant P l . Here, m, l ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1}, s = l, the key x f is used to fool P l . It is easy to verify that the final key P l obtained is the fake key x f ⊕ K . In order to detect the malicious behavior, the N participants P 0 , · · · , P N −1 randomly select τ m positions from the final K , and announce the corresponding value to check whether there is a malicious participant who introduces a fake key to target parties of his choice. Here, 0 ≤ τ < 1. If there the error rate is higher than the security level required, the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, the rest untest keys of K is used for the final key. This is one simple way to check malicious behavior, but we cannot prevent it. In the future study, quantum bit commitment and other classical post-processing method may be considered in the proposed protocol to prevent this dishonest behavior.
Note that since our circular quantum protocol transmits the same photons more than once, it may suffer from the Trojan horse attacks. Such kind of circular quantum transmission has been discussed [22] . To prevent this type of attacks, the participants can install a special quantum optical device such as the wavelength quantum filter and the photon number splitters (PNS) to detect an attack. Eve's invisible photons can be filtered out by using the wavelength quantum filter, and the PNS can split each legitimate photon to discover the delay photons. If there is an irrational high rate of multiphoton signal, then the attack can be detected. This kind of Trojan horse attack is not an exploit of a weakness of the protocol in itself, but rather an exploit of a weakness in certain imperfect implementations. Without the imperfection of the singlephoton detectors, this kind of Trojan horse attack will not exist any longer.
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will compare the qubit efficiency of the proposed quantum key agreement protocol with that of several existing secure multiparty quantum key agreement protocols. The qubit efficiency of the proposed MQKA protocol is given as η = c q+b , where c denotes the length of the transmitted message bits (the length of the final key), q is the number of the used qubits, and b is the number of classical bits exchanged for decoding of the message (classical communication used for checking eavesdropping is not counted).
Liu et al.'s protocol (LGHW protocol) [9] is based on BB84 and all participants distributed their secret keys to others. This protocol can be easier to be realized. However, the qubit efficiency can be computed as [21] can be secure against t internal attackers. In order to generate n bits of shared key, each party has to prepare tn single photons and κtn decoy states, thus the qubit efficiency of their protocol can be computed as 1 (κ+1)tN . For easier comparison, let the detection rate κ = 1, the dishonest participants t = N − 1, i.e., the protocol can be secure against N − 1 dishonest participants, with the qubit efficiency bits of shared key in the ideal condition (for easier comparison with other protocols, suppose the odd primes number d can be rewritten as a N bit binary number), each party has to prepare l single photons. In each transmission of the protocol, l decoy qubits are used to detect eavesdropping. Since the message sequence will be transmitted N times in each transmission, lN decoy states are needed. As there are N parties in the protocol and N rounds of transmission, the total number of qubits used is N (l +lN ). The participants announce lN (N −1) bits to decode the shared key. Hence, the qubit efficiency of our protocol can be computed as
The efficiency comparison of the above protocols can be seen in Table 1 . Fig. 2 shows that when the number of participants is larger than 4, our protocol's efficiency is much better than other protocols'.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we first show that the CM MQKA protocol can be broken by Liu's collusive attack. Then, an efficient MQKA protocol is proposed which requires only sequential communication of a single d-level quantum system. It has huge advantages in scalability and can be realized with the-state-of-the-art technology. And meanwhile the quantum channel is encrypted by a unitary operation during the key agreement protocol. Thus, the key stealing stage attack of Liu cannot work anymore. The efficiency analysis shows that our protocol is more efficient than most existing secure multiparty QKA protocols. Moreover, by using the proposed method, a wide class of problems for which quantum information protocols based on multisystem entanglement can be mapped into much simpler ones involving only one system. We hope the results of the presented paper will be helpful for further research on more secure and fairer MQKA protocols. 
